Immediately supported by right-wing and far-right politicians, this group (which later became Family Generation in 2016, and then Pro-Life and Family in 2019) was born to oppose public policies, laws, and bills concerning women and LGBTQI+ rights. In their eyes, those are the result of the spread of a new form of totalitarian and anti-natural ideology, which they generally call “the theory of gender” or “gender ideology.” The first phase was focused on building a movement of protest in the streets, particularly by the organization of several local and national demonstrations, such as the so-called Family Day, in 2015 and 2016. Taking advantage of the political opportunities offered by some national and European elections and thanks to the close alliance with the League and Brothers of Italy, the anti-gender movement has become a political actor, able to influence populist right-wing forces’ ideology and programs. But also, decisions and debates on gender, sexuality, and family in Italy.

To summarize, this movement has been able to renew the modalities of action of an area of radical Catholicism through 1. an extra-ecclesiastical positioning out the spaces of the Italian Catholic Chruch; 2. an extra-Catholic positioning beyond the religious-based traditional pro-life movement; 3. a political positioning in public arenas as the spokesperson and representative of a new course of secularized Catholic politics.

The anti-gender movement is the instrument that a new entrepreneurial class of Neo-Catholic activism has strategically designed, in Italy, to face the challenge posed by the democratic paradigm to an ex-politicized and de-politicized religion. The politics of these movements claim an ability to act within a democracy, challenge democracy itself, and establish a new counter-democratic, perhaps even anti-democratic, paradigm, based on the “natural” values of the tradition that challenge the “anti-natural” values of civil rights.

In recent years patriarchal gender norms and ideologies have become an integral part of the right-wing populist parties programs. Right-wing leaders, including Jarosław Kaczyński, Victor Orban, Jair Bolsonaro and Matteo Salvini have invested in creating their image as defenders of traditional family and the nation against the excesses of what they call “gender ideology.” Such a stance have helped them to gain public support: a 2019 opinion poll showed that when asked about the biggest threats for Poland in the 21st century, the majority of young men and older people declared that their biggest fear is the threat of the “gender ideology and LGBT movement.”

The presentation will focus on the relationship between populism and gender. Rather than looking for specific gendered aspects of populism as an ideology, it examines a growing opportunistic synergy between the right-wing parties and ultraconservative groups opposing “gender.” This synergy plays out on two distinct levels: ideological/discursive and strategic/organizational. Since populism is not a robust ideological project, it readily feeds on ideas and narrative structures promoted by the anti-gender ultraconservative movement, albeit often in an opportunistic and selective fashion. Populists also cooperate closely with the anti-gender organizations as they need new cadres in the process of a sweeping elite change. Simultaneously, the actors behind anti-gender campaigns use the organizational resources that right-wing parties offer and access to political processes, especially in contexts such as Poland where the latter are in power. What facilitates this collusion is the fact that the ultraconservative critiques of “gender” have been framed in populist terms. The movement presents itself as a necessary and courageous defense of “the people” against powerful and foreign “liberal elites,” with “gender ideology” emphatically identified as a modern version of colonialism.