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		<title>Written contribution by Luna Vega and Martin Renz, Propaganda and its victims</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/written-contribution-by-luna-vega-and-martin-renz-propaganda-and-its-victims/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:14:29 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Propaganda? In today&#8217;s parlance, this is primarily a problem attributed to political opponents. They fall for propaganda; they are its &#8220;victims.&#8221; They blindly believe the obvious lies spouted–depending on their political position–by established political parties and the media or by populists and fascists. Accordingly, some say: politics has always been and always will be propagandistic. <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/written-contribution-by-luna-vega-and-martin-renz-propaganda-and-its-victims/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Propaganda? In today&#8217;s parlance, this is primarily a problem attributed to political opponents. They fall for propaganda; they are its &#8220;victims.&#8221; They blindly believe the obvious lies spouted–depending on their political position–by established political parties and the media or by populists and fascists. Accordingly, some say: politics has always been and always will be propagandistic. Everybody lies to further their own interests, and anyone who overlooks this is naïve or lies to themselves.</p>
<p>A &#8216;victim&#8217; of propaganda is always someone else, because recognizing propaganda is only easy for those who don&#8217;t fall for it: its opponents and its &#8216;culprits&#8217;–that is, those who engage in propaganda. But is it really so easy to distinguish victims, opponents, and culprits?</p>
<p>The intuitive answer to this question is surely a resounding &#8216;no.&#8217; Nonetheless the word propaganda is often used as if there were a clear distinction between propagandistic and non-propagandistic communication. This raises some urgent issues that visitors to the exhibition &#8220;Propaganda – Flooding the Zone With Shit – It&#8217;s About Money, Stupid&#8221; might ask themselves: Is it always possible to clearly distinguish between propagandists and their victims? Does propaganda have a look? Is there a specific form of propaganda that can be recognized regardless of its specific content? Can facts, truth, and honesty play a role in public debate, or is politics always driven solely by ideology and vested interests? If politics and propaganda are indistinguishable anyway, why does the word sound like an accusation? Isn&#8217;t it usually expected that public statements are honest and true?</p>
<p><strong>Flooding the Zone</strong></p>
<p>The Latin root of propaganda – <em>propagare</em> – refers to systematic dissemination and spread. A related term is virality, which is used to describe information that spreads like a germ, driven by the laws of the attention economy. Sensationalism, polarization, and uncertainty continue to guarantee high engagement rates on various platforms–and are therefore also financially lucrative. But while viral content spreads for the sake of spreading, propaganda always serves a political, economic, or cultural purpose.</p>
<p>Anyone who suggests that a statement, post, or poster is propaganda claims that it is disseminated not because of its inherent quality or the truth of its content, but because it is effective in distributing a message. Accordingly, debates around propaganda always also discuss technical and media innovations. To understand propaganda it is essential to gain insight into the technical, economic, and media conditions under which political opinions are disseminated.</p>
<p>However, not every political or technical effort to convince others of one&#8217;s own position is propaganda. The distinguishing feature of propaganda is that truth has a place in it only to the extent that it does not hinder the effective dissemination of a specific worldview or pattern of opinion.</p>
<p>The quote by Steve Bannon that gives the exhibition its title is exemplary of this kind of propagandistic perspective on politics:</p>
<p>&#8220;The Democrats don&#8217;t matter [&#8230;]. The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal with them is to flood the zone with shit.&#8221;<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a></p>
<p>This is how Bannon identifies a central propaganda technique of digital mass media: public debate must be flooded–not with coherent arguments or facts, but with trivialities, falsehoods, and dog whistles–in short: &#8220;with shit.&#8221; This amounts to an admission. Bannon clearly does not believe that truth should play a central role in public debate–at least not any truth that stands in the way of his ideology. What is crucial here is the thrust of this strategy: it is directed not only against immediate political opponents, but specifically against &#8216;the media.&#8217; The artificial flood of irrelevant information–whether it&#8217;s the fuss over the &#8216;Gulf of America,&#8217; emotionally charged debates about the skin color of a Hollywood cast, or the latest rhetorical outburst from the White House–serves as a diversion. On such an understanding, the primary purpose of propaganda is to constantly flood public debate with strikingly irrelevant topics so as to suppress the discussion of people&#8217;s real concerns.</p>
<p>Bannon&#8217;s openness in talking about these issues also shows that there seems to be no need to hide propaganda. But we suspect that it is precisely its recognizability that is an advantage: it makes it easier for supporters to spread it and promote it–regardless of its content. Visitors to the exhibition can form their own opinions about whether there are specific recognizable ways in which propaganda appears. Can propaganda be identified not only due to its content, but also in its form?</p>
<p><strong>Big Lies and Tacit Complicity</strong></p>
<p>Let&#8217;s assume for a moment that propaganda is often quite easy to recognize. In that case, the impact of propaganda is not limited to the seduction or manipulation of the public, because then its supposed &#8216;victims&#8217; are also its &#8216;perpetrators.&#8217; Propaganda is then always a collaborative endeavor as well. Anyone who recognizes propaganda as such and agrees with it precisely for that reason is making a conscious decision. They value their political opinions or interests more highly than what is real or true.</p>
<p>Historically, this attitude is linked to the concept of the “big lie”—a term from Adolf Hitler’s <em>Mein Kampf </em>that has taken on new significance since Donald Trump spread the lie surrounding the allegedly rigged 2020 U.S. presidential election:</p>
<p>&#8220;In this they proceeded on the sound principle that the magnitude of a lie always contains a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of the people in the very bottom of their hearts tend to be corrupted rather than consciously and purposely evil, and that, therefore, in view of the primitive simplicity of their minds, they more easily fall a victim to a big lie than to a little one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads, and they will not be able to believe in the possibility of such monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation in others; yes, even when enlightened on the subject, they will long doubt and waver, and continue to accept at least one of these causes as true. Therefore, something of even the most insolent lie will always remain and stick.&#8221;<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a></p>
<p>Two characteristic features of a propagandistic attitude are clearly evident in this quote. First, it reveals a contempt for the “masses,” whom Hitler portrays as simple-minded and incapable of grasping the truth. The lie he is referring to here is also “big” in the sense that it is actually easy to recognize as a lie—and that is precisely why it is effective. Second, historically, the quote is situated within the context of two central right-wing conspiracy myths: the “stab-in-the-back” myth–according to which Germany was not defeated militarily but due to the activities of democrats, socialists, and Jewish people–and the narrative of a communist-Jewish global conspiracy. Hitler presents his own lie as a necessary countermeasure couched in other propagandistic lies. The “big lie” is thus disguised as self-defense with no alternative and as counter-propaganda. Whether he, as a propagandist, believes in these conspiracy narratives himself is not really relevant. What matters is the dogmatic conviction that in political struggle, it is not the truth that decides the outcome, but victory alone: effectiveness.</p>
<p>This is where the cycle of victim and culprit comes full circle. Whether the individual actually believes every detail of the lie becomes secondary. What matters is the willingness to agree. The “big lie” relieves the believer of reality&#8217;s complexity and forges a sense of identity against an imagined enemy. &#8220;Falling for it&#8221; thus becomes a form of complicity, either because collaborators want to believe it or it becomes an oath of loyalty, through which one hopes to gain personal advantages by going along with the lie. Thus understood, propaganda is a discursive framework in which irresponsible and deceitful political behavior is normalized.</p>
<p><strong>Against Counter-Propaganda</strong></p>
<p>The greatest allure of propaganda lies in the way it is presented as having no alternative. This applies to war, where it is used to demoralize the enemy, as it does to marketing—which, in Germany until the early 20th century, was openly called “propaganda” and, driven by the pursuit of profit, during the 20th century tended to create new needs rather than promising to satisfy those that already existed.</p>
<p>But it is even more obvious in politics. When confronted with propaganda, even small-d democrats are tempted to denounce the truth. Resorting to counter-propaganda then seems like an appealing means of defense–especially since we rarely have direct access to irrefutable facts, but are always reliant on mediation, research, and expertise; this makes lying easy and speaking the truth difficult. Yet anyone who responds with counter-propaganda tacitly accepts the propagandistic outlook on politics: politics then degenerates into a mudslinging contest over who can make the biggest spectacle.</p>
<p>However, if we leave the field to propagandists, social reality disconnects from those institutions that specialize in uncovering and conserving the truth. This is where a second aspect of Bannon&#8217;s quote becomes relevant. It is not aimed at his immediate political opponent, the Democratic Party, but at the media–and not primarily in its role as opinion-shaper. After all, opinion columns do address the Gulf of America or the skin color of the latest Hollywood cast, or Trump&#8217;s most recent verbal outburst. What Bannon is actually attacking is one of journalism&#8217;s core functions, which is increasingly drowning. Journalism always also had the task of reporting and verifying facts, to weigh different perspectives, and to make informed and criticizable choices about what should be considered socially relevant. But when newsrooms are constantly flooded with supposed breaking news, there&#8217;s no longer any need to confront uncomfortable truths–simply because they can&#8217;t be heard.</p>
<p>Other institutions responsible for researching facts are also under fire due to the propagandization of politics: academia, the courts, museums, universities, and archives. As precarious and open to scrutiny as these institutions may be individually, they are nonetheless based on the consensus that verifiable truth in the public sphere is both necessary and possible.</p>
<p>The democratic response to propaganda should therefore not consist in counter-propaganda or endless fact-checking. What is needed is a clear commitment to the value of uncomfortable truths, as well as legal and social remembrance and protection for all those who uncover it–from Émile Zola (&#8220;J&#8217;accuse&#8221;) and John Heartfield, through WikiLeaks and Forensic Architecture, to Edward Snowden, Alexei Navalny, and Chelsea Manning. After all, the work of truth-tellers and whistleblowers may have its own distinct look as well, which the exhibition brings to life.</p>
<p>Dealing with propaganda is not just about education or lecturing. Reports of families torn apart by the appeal of conspiracy narratives (as in the context of the MAGA movement) highlight the need for a shift in perspective. Instead of asking &#8220;Do people really believe these things?&#8221; we should ask, &#8220;Why do people actually want to believe these things?&#8221; What political interests, promises, or emotional relief does this narrative serve? What neglect and failings have fueled these desires? How can we create a political system that actually serves people? And which existing societal problems and stereotypes provide fertile ground for belief in and support of propaganda?</p>
<p>We should pause and consider how to face propaganda and its collaborators. When the zone is flooded, the solution isn&#8217;t to paddle endlessly against the current, but to drain the pool–to drain the shit.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a></p>
<p>References<br />
<a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Michael Lewis, „Has Anyone Seen the President?“, <em>Bloomberg</em>, 9. Februar 2018, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-09/has-anyone-seen-the-president">https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-09/has-anyone-seen-the-president</a>  [16.10.2026].</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Ralph Manheim, Übers., <em>Mein Kampf</em> (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1971), S. 231f.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> We thank Robert Thyssen, Sonja Dormeyer and Luca Schepers for helpful feedback.</p>
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		<title>Written contribution by Robin Jaspert, Flooding the Zone with Profit</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/written-contribution-by-robin-jaspert-flooding-the-zone-with-profit/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 13:04:37 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46672</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Every day, we are inundated with advertising and propaganda. This stream of information that is of no use to us, and with which we want nothing to do, is generated by corporations whose business model depends on persuading people to adopt purchasing desires and political opinions that are not their own. And while we struggle <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/written-contribution-by-robin-jaspert-flooding-the-zone-with-profit/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Every day, we are inundated with advertising and propaganda. This stream of information that is of no use to us, and with which we want nothing to do, is generated by corporations whose business model depends on persuading people to adopt purchasing desires and political opinions that are not their own.</p>
<p>And while we struggle to find a healthy way of dealing with this information overload and the sense of being overwhelmed that it creates, corporate profits rise and wages fall. This relationship is most striking in the United States. Between 1980 and 2026, corporate profits as a share of national income rose from 9 to 16 per cent. Over the same period, the share going to wages fell from 56 to 51 per cent.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[i]</a> This represents a shift of trillions of dollars. The weakening of organised labour and the deregulation of private business are driving these trends.</p>
<p>This growing divergence between wages and profits is taking place at the height of neoliberalism, an economic policy agenda that inhibits growth and redistributes wealth from the top down. At the same time, the successful business models of the world’s most valuable listed corporations are changing. Some of the most important companies on global stock markets no longer specialise in producing goods. They specialise in marketing other corporations’ goods or collecting the data required to do so. Collecting, aggregating, processing and selling personalised data for advertising purposes is one of their most important sources of profit. And companies that do produce goods, giving their products a new look every year without adding genuinely new functions, depend on advertising if they are to avoid being swallowed up by larger competitors.</p>
<p><strong>Monopolies and the Advertising Industry</strong></p>
<p>The rise of data-processing industries is a consequence of the structure of capitalist markets. Left unregulated, these markets tend towards concentration and domination by a handful of corporations. Companies that achieve such a position are described as monopolies or oligopolies. When a few monopolistic corporations dominate an industry, they often no longer compete primarily by undercutting one another’s prices. Instead, they use advertising and continually launch seemingly new products to stimulate demand and gain market share. When monopolies dominate an economy or sector, the advertising industry becomes more important. As Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy observed in 1968, the twentieth century marked the beginning of the age of monopolies. They were proved right.</p>
<p>This is also reflected in the advertising industry. Advertising expenditure has risen dramatically over the past 75 years. Total annual advertising expenditure in the United States amounted to around US$450 million in 1900, approximately US$5.7 billion in 1950 and, according to current estimates, a staggering US$732 billion today. In Germany, the equivalent of US$30 billion was spent on advertising in 2025. Advertising therefore accounted for around 1.5 per cent of total value added in the United States in 2025, and around 0.6 per cent in Germany.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[ii]</a> Annual advertising expenditure in Germany is thus roughly equivalent to the combined budgets of the federal ministries of health and development.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[iii]</a></p>
<p>Over this period, the ratio of advertising expenditure to total value added has not increased significantly in either the United States or Germany. This may initially seem at odds with the claim that advertising has become more important, but the explanation is straightforward. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, advertising always addressed a broad audience. It was not targeted at specific groups. A hedge fund requiring a substantial initial investment was unlikely to be advertised in a trade union newspaper, but the advertising channels available did not always reach their intended audiences. While expenditure on this traditional marketing has almost completely stagnated over the past 20 years, spending on the far more precise forms of digital marketing has risen by more than 300 per cent since 2000.<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[iv]</a> This does not mean that outdoor advertising has disappeared. Germany’s leading advertising provider, Ströer Media Group, still generates around 40 per cent of its revenue from billboards and advertising panels.<a href="#_edn5" name="_ednref5">[v]</a> Nevertheless, corporations can now spend less money on far more precisely targeted advertising. They achieve greater impact at lower cost.</p>
<p><strong>Big Tech</strong></p>
<p>This is possible primarily because the collection, aggregation, analysis and sale of personal data allow advertising to be targeted at very specific audiences. The data required for this form of advertising are central to the business models of numerous IT corporations. At the top of the industry are five US companies: Apple, Alphabet<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a>, Microsoft, Amazon and Meta. On 30 September 2026, their combined value accounted for 24.7 per cent of the S&amp;P 500, the leading US stock market index.<a href="#_edn6" name="_ednref6">[vi]</a> In early October 2026, their total market value stood at just under €17.25 trillion.<a href="#_edn7" name="_ednref7">[vii]</a> That is around 34 times Germany’s entire federal budget. Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon and Meta are the heavyweights of the global economy.</p>
<p>These corporations do not make all their money from advertising. Their business models differ. Apple is the exception that proves the rule. The company founded by Steve Jobs generates almost all its profits from selling devices to end users. Microsoft also makes some of its profits from selling devices, but supplying software, computing capacity and cloud services to other companies is far more important. Amazon, meanwhile, makes only a small share of its profits – at most 15 per cent, depending on the estimate – from selling goods to individual consumers, its seemingly central business activity. A much larger share comes from providing cloud services and computing power, while at least 36 per cent comes from advertising. At Alphabet, advertising accounts for the lion’s share, at 76 per cent, while Meta makes its money from virtually nothing else.<a href="#_edn8" name="_ednref8">[viii]</a></p>
<p>Meta and Google therefore profit by analysing user data and using it to inundate us with targeted advertising. Why advertising is so omnipresent today is thus a fairly simple question to answer: because it is profitable; because it is the business model of some of the world’s most important and powerful technology corporations. And because competition in industries with highly concentrated power takes place primarily through advertising and the regular launch of new products. Adidas and Puma do not compete by undercutting one another’s prices. Every year, they release overpriced shoes and tracksuit jackets. These products are not expensive because of fair wages or high material costs. A substantial share of their budgets is allocated to product development, which rarely amounts to more than a new look. These new products, combined with targeted advertising, primarily online, are intended to provide the decisive competitive advantage. A glance at our city centres and wardrobes reveals whether it works.</p>
<p><strong>Consequences</strong></p>
<p>Our society is so thoroughly dominated by these mechanisms that they appear entirely normal. Yet they bring a whole range of destructive consequences, from labour relations to public finances, political influence and artificial intelligence.</p>
<p>The technology industry’s business model has a significant impact on the relationship between wages and profits. It employs far fewer people than other industries. The data-processing sector, in which Alphabet, Amazon and Meta operate, still generates 46 per cent of its revenue from selling support services provided by people. Yet labour’s share of profits is considerably lower than in other industries. Across the US private sector, labour costs as a proportion of total business expenditure are, on average, five times higher than in the technology industry.<a href="#_edn9" name="_ednref9">[ix]</a> Alongside finance, IT is therefore one of the sectors in which employment as a share of the total population falls furthest below its share of profits.</p>
<p>At least in theory, these profits could subsequently be redistributed through taxation for the benefit of the public. But this does not happen. Around half of global tax revenue comes from consumption and payroll taxes – taxes paid by workers and consumers, rather than companies and financial actors.<a href="#_edn10" name="_ednref10">[x]</a></p>
<p>Big Tech is at the forefront of tax avoidance, particularly in the European Union. Alphabet operates globally but pays tax on its profits in low-tax Ireland. Until 2024, Apple paid only 2.4 per cent of its profits in tax.<a href="#_edn11" name="_ednref11">[xi]</a> In Germany, single employees without children earning an average wage pay 17.2 per cent in income tax.<a href="#_edn12" name="_ednref12">[xii]</a> Apple has since been required to pay around €14 billion in back taxes to Ireland,<a href="#_edn13" name="_ednref13">[xiii]</a> yet the holes in tax regulations remain larger than those in our ozone layer. And Apple is no exception. Like Google, Meta and Apple are resident in Ireland for tax purposes. Amazon hides its profits in the tax haven of Luxembourg. The EU and individual states repeatedly pursue proceedings against these practices. Current moves towards a global minimum tax are a step in the right direction. Yet, given Big Tech’s well-funded legal departments and the political backing of Donald Trump, who uses threats of tariffs to prevent the taxation of US digital corporations in the United States, substantial material gains remain the exception.</p>
<p>Added to this are the opportunities for political influence through advertising – what we traditionally understand as propaganda. Official government expenditure on campaigns is increasing. In the United States, the government under Trump spent around US$1.8 billion on political campaigns in 2024. In Germany, state expenditure on political campaigns amounted to €60 million in 2025. Of this, €40 million was intended to entice young people, especially men, into the Bundeswehr as cannon fodder.<a href="#_edn14" name="_ednref14">[xiv]</a> Spending by political parties is even more significant. Republicans and Democrats together spent at least US$3.5 billion on the 2024 presidential election campaign, a substantial proportion of it on digital advertising.<a href="#_edn15" name="_ednref15">[xv]</a> German political parties spent at least €817 million in total on the federal elections of 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021.<a href="#_edn16" name="_ednref16">[xvi]</a> Figures for the 2025 election are not yet available. What is known is that parties spent at least €9.2 million on advertisements on Meta. Alliance 90/The Greens topped the list.<a href="#_edn17" name="_ednref17">[xvii]</a> There is, at least, one positive development: political advertising has been subject to strict regulation in the European Union since October 2025. The regulations are so far-reaching that Meta has stopped allowing advertisements on political, electoral and social issues since their introduction. Google has also decided to stop carrying advertisements from politicians and political parties.</p>
<p>The potential impact of the rise of artificial intelligence on the advertising industry remains difficult to predict. The political, sexist and racist biases of these models are well documented and already exert far-reaching implicit influence. AI is already being used systematically for disinformation and propaganda. Although AI providers do not yet carry explicit advertising, this appears to be only a matter of time. They systematically collect and analyse their users’ data. It is highly unlikely that an industry that remains largely unprofitable will refrain from using these data for advertising and thus for profit. It is equally unlikely that this advertising will be used for the benefit of the majority.</p>
<p><strong>It shouldn’t be about money, stupid!</strong></p>
<p>In light of all this, it is worth imagining a world without advertising. Would we still need to worry about funding our welfare system if corporations paid their fair share towards it? How much cheaper would our lives be if companies did not devote a substantial proportion of their budgets to advertising and pointless product development, and passed those savings on to their customers? And how much potential would be released if all those intelligent people stopped wasting their time and talent in the world’s advertising and marketing agencies and instead devoted themselves to meaningful work?</p>
<p>The path towards such a world is political. It involves confronting private business, particularly the corporations whose business model is advertising and propaganda. The ban on political advertising on social media is a good example of a step in the right direction. If the industry’s influence is to be genuinely curtailed, however, this can only be a first step. Banning outdoor advertising in city centres would be another. A measure with even greater material impact would be comprehensive taxation of corporations that do not contribute to social prosperity and primarily cause harm. We must also debate whether we want an ever greater share of our democratic public sphere to be organised on profit-driven platforms that tech fascists can simply buy up and steer politically. And do we really want a handful of technology corporations to collect all our personal data and feed it into artificial intelligence whose destructive potential is enormous? My answer is no: this is the worst conceivable way to organise our communication and our democracy.</p>
<p>A far better way to organise our public life is through trade unions, political organisations, parties, clubs and associations – above all, those that resist the complete commercialisation of our lives. These are the places where change towards a better society is not merely imagined in the abstract, but organised through concrete political action.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>References and Data Sources</p>
<p>Baran, P.A. and Sweezy, P.M., 1968. <em>Monopoly capital: an essay on the American economic and social order</em>. New York: Monthly Review Press.</p>
<p>Baslandze, S., Greenwood, J., Marto, R., and Moreira, S., 2023. The expansion of varieties in the new age of advertising. <em>Review of Economic Dynamics</em>, 50, 171–210.</p>
<p>Groneweg, M. and Godar, S., 2025. Viele Milliardäre zahlen weniger Steuern als die Mittelschicht [online]. <em>Jacobin</em>. Available from: https://jacobin.de/steuerpolitik-umverteilung-koerperschaftssteuer-mindeststeuer/ [Accessed 5 Oct 2026].</p>
<p>Norris, A.K. and Espinosa, T., 2026. A Refutation of “Rent” in Technofeudalism and Knowledge-Commodity Theories: Toward a Theory of Surplus Profits. <em>Review of Radical Political Economics</em>, online first.</p>
<p>Sawyer, M., 2026. Neo-Liberalism and the Slowing of Growth in the Past Four Decades. <em>Review of Political Economy</em>, 1–11.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Google’s parent company</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[i]</a> Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Author’s calculations.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[ii]</a> Data from Robert J. Coen &amp; Statista. The Statista data were converted using the methodology of Baslandze <em>et al.</em> (2023) to ensure comparability.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[iii]</a> Data from Bundeshaushalt.de</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[iv]</a> Data from Baslandze et al. (2023)</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref5" name="_edn5">[v]</a> Data from Ströer Media Group’s 2025 annual report.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref6" name="_edn6">[vi]</a> Data from Standards &amp; Poor.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref7" name="_edn7">[vii]</a> Data from Companies Market Cap</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref8" name="_edn8">[viii]</a> Data from Norris and Espinosa (2026)</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref9" name="_edn9">[ix]</a> Data from Norris and Espinosa (2026)</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref10" name="_edn10">[x]</a> Data from Gronenweg &amp; Godar (2025)</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref11" name="_edn11">[xi]</a> Data from Kontrast.at</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref12" name="_edn12">[xii]</a> Data from the Federal Ministry of Finance and the OECD</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref13" name="_edn13">[xiii]</a> Data from Tagesschau.de</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref14" name="_edn14">[xiv]</a> Data from drucksachlich.de</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref15" name="_edn15">[xv]</a> Data from OpenSecrets.com</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref16" name="_edn16">[xvi]</a> Data from Statista</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref17" name="_edn17">[xvii]</a> Data from Who Targets Me</p>
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		<title>#Sylt: Wie ein Ohrwurm zur rechten Hymne wurde</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/sylt-wie-ein-ohrwurm-zur-rechten-hymne-wurde-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 16:28:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Senza categoria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46507</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena), Rina Wilkin #Sylt: Wie ein Ohrwurm zur rechten Hymne wurde, 2026 Video 08:22 min &#160; In May 2024, a short video went viral of affluent partygoers on the German island of Sylt who were filmed chanting racist slogans to the song “L’amour Toujours” – slogans otherwise associated <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/sylt-wie-ein-ohrwurm-zur-rechten-hymne-wurde-2/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena), Rina Wilkin </strong></p>
<p><em>#Sylt: Wie ein Ohrwurm zur rechten Hymne wurde</em>, 2026<br />
Video<br />
08:22 min</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In May 2024, a short video went viral of affluent partygoers on the German island of Sylt who were filmed chanting racist slogans to the song “L’amour Toujours” – slogans otherwise associated with neo-Nazis. Until then, the altered version of the song had mainly been an insider phenomenon, sung provocatively at local festivals, but the Sylt video took it to a new level. The local incident made the national evening news, and even the German Chancellor commented on it. The case then took on a life of its own: suddenly, almost everyone knew the racist version of the song. For the far right, this was a stroke of luck; for the digital public sphere, a disaster.</p>
<p>This video shows how this dynamic unfolded on TikTok. In the week following the incident on Sylt, tens of thousands of posts appeared on TikTok under related hashtags. Whether motivated by approval, the pursuit of reach or criticism, it was precisely this interplay of widely differing actors and motivations engaging with the incident that created the viral moment. This momentum was further amplified by media coverage that turned a local event into a national debate. It was also at this point that public condemnation was accompanied by expressions of solidarity with the perpetrators: many perceived the public response, which displayed elements of a moral panic, as excessive. At the same time, actors ranging from the right to the far right deliberately appropriated the song and turned it into a political code: at Querdenken demonstrations, European Championship fan marches, on merchandise and on the walls of buildings. And internationally, too, it became a symbol of xenophobia and fundamental opposition, as well as an anthem for those presenting themselves as victims of a supposed culture of prohibition.</p>
<p>Remarkably, most of the videos surrounding the incident were posted by critics. Through their counterspeech, they inadvertently kept the catchy tune alive. This created a dilemma: racist slogans cannot be left unchallenged, yet responding to them can undermine the very cause being defended and play into the hands of those who deliberately use provocation to elicit overreactions from the state and society. The case demonstrates that digital propaganda often spreads spontaneously and unpredictably. It was hard to foresee that this particular incident, among many similar ones, would trigger a nationwide debate. Yet it can serve as a case study in how digital propaganda thrives on overreaction and how decentralised mechanisms of dissemination can be particularly effective.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Text, research and data:  Maik Fielitz, Michael Schmidt and Wyn Brodersen</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
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		<title>#Stolzmonat: Anatomie einer rechtsextremen Online-Kampagne</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/stolzmonat-anatomie-einer-rechtsextremen-online-kampagne-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 16:27:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Senza categoria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46505</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena), Rina Wilkin #Stolzmonat: Anatomie einer rechtsextremen Online-Kampagne, 2026 Video 10:23 min &#160; In late May 2023, far-right activists on Twitter (now X) launched “Stolzmonat”: a nationalist online campaign conceived as a counter-model to the LGBTQ+-friendly Pride Month. What appeared to be spontaneous outrage was in fact a <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/stolzmonat-anatomie-einer-rechtsextremen-online-kampagne-2/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena), Rina Wilkin </strong></p>
<p><em>#Stolzmonat: Anatomie einer rechtsextremen Online-Kampagne</em>, 2026<br />
Video<br />
10:23 min</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In late May 2023, far-right activists on Twitter (now X) launched “Stolzmonat”: a nationalist online campaign conceived as a counter-model to the LGBTQ+-friendly Pride Month. What appeared to be spontaneous outrage was in fact a carefully planned propaganda campaign organised around a hashtag (#stolzmonat). Within less than a month, more than 889,000 posts using the hashtag were circulated. From AfD members of parliament to militant neo-Nazis, thousands of accounts rallied behind a German-themed flag modelled on the design of the rainbow flag. And ready-made memes and accompanying slogans served as an invitation to participate.</p>
<p>This video shows how, with a degree of digital know-how, nationalist propaganda can be strategically carried into the societal mainstream. In principle, this requires little more than a small group of committed activists, a few supporters with a large reach and a polarised public. The committed activists provide the material and set the tone, and they operate fake accounts that like and share their own content hundreds of times within a very short period. Influential channels, such as Björn Höcke’s, adopt the campaign’s visual language and call on their audiences to support it. Even opponents of the campaign inadvertently contributed to its success: outraged responses, counter-campaigns from the left and even warnings issued by security authorities increased the hashtag’s visibility and brought it to the attention of the media.</p>
<p>This reveals the central dilemma that anyone seeking to raise awareness of digital propaganda also contributes to the visibility of the campaigns in question. The pattern of amplification surrounding Stolzmonat is typical: a topic already under public discussion is appropriated and filled with specific content, an army of hyperactive accounts pushes a memorable hashtag into trending topics and, eventually, the media can no longer ignore the artificially generated momentum. Once the media begin to contextualise such content, the strategically disseminated digital propaganda has achieved its objective.</p>
<p>Text, research and data: Maik Fielitz and Harald Sick</p>
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		<title>Quiz on Political Euphemisms</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/quiz-on-political-euphemisms/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 16:20:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Senza categoria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46571</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Quiz on Political Euphemisms, 2026 Video Slideshow 14 questions Courtesy Frankfurter Kunstverein and Elena Artemenko The Frankfurter Kunstverein team has developed an app to explore euphemisms in political communication in a playful way. A euphemism is an expression that embellishes, softens, or conceals meaning. It replaces a word that is perceived as unpleasant, offensive, taboo, <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/quiz-on-political-euphemisms/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Quiz on Political Euphemisms</em>, 2026<br />
Video Slideshow<br />
14 questions</p>
<p>Courtesy Frankfurter Kunstverein and Elena Artemenko<br />
The Frankfurter Kunstverein team has developed an app to explore euphemisms in political communication in a playful way. A euphemism is an expression that embellishes, softens, or conceals meaning. It replaces a word that is perceived as unpleasant, offensive, taboo, or too harsh with a softer or more positive phrasing.</p>
<p>In the interactive quiz, visitors can discover common phrases used in public discourse that obscure their true meaning. Special thanks go to Elena Artemenko, whose expertise – particularly regarding political language in Russia – helped shape the quiz’s design and content.</p>
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		<title>Robin Jaspert</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/robin-jaspert/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 16:19:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Senza categoria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46600</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Geschäftsmodelle der Big-Tech Konzerne, 2026 Vinyl print on plexiglass 150 x 84 cm Courtesy Norris &#38; Espinosa Anteil von Profit und Arbeit am US-Nationaleinkommen, 2026 print on plexiglass 150 x 84 cm Courtesy Bureau of Economic Analysis Gesamt-Werbeausgaben USA, 2026 Vinyl print on plexiglass 150 x 84 cm Courtesy Robert J. Coen &#38; Statista &#160; <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/robin-jaspert/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Geschäftsmodelle der Big-Tech Konzerne</em>, 2026</p>
<p>Vinyl print on plexiglass 150 x 84 cm</p>
<p>Courtesy Norris &amp; Espinosa</p>
<p><em>Anteil von Profit und Arbeit am US-Nationaleinkommen</em>, 2026</p>
<p>print on plexiglass</p>
<p>150 x 84 cm</p>
<p>Courtesy Bureau of Economic Analysis</p>
<p><em>Gesamt-Werbeausgaben USA</em>, 2026</p>
<p>Vinyl print on plexiglass 150 x 84 cm</p>
<p>Courtesy Robert J. Coen &amp; Statista</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>We invited political economist Robin Jaspert to explore the key relationships between Big Tech corporations, their profits, labour and fiscal policy for the exhibition. He has contributed three economic charts, which can be read in spatial dialogue with Ben Grosser’s artworks.</p>
<p>Robin Jaspert examines the relationship between the growing power of global technology corporations, the advertising industry and political influence. His central thesis is that advertising and propaganda are not peripheral phenomena, but essential components of an economic system increasingly controlled by a small number of dominant corporations.</p>
<p>Companies such as Meta and Alphabet generate most of their revenue through personalised advertising. This business model relies on the systematic collection and analysis of personal data. Digital platforms make it possible to target people with commercial and political messages with ever greater precision and to influence their behaviour. At the same time, the distribution of socially generated wealth is shifting: while corporate profits rise, the relative share of income going to wages declines. And the market power of large corporations is further strengthened by tax avoidance and their ability to exert political influence.</p>
<p>Jaspert argues that the increasing commercialisation of our communication has far-reaching consequences for democracy. Political opinion formation increasingly takes place on privately owned platforms whose business models are based on profit maximisation, and the rise of artificial intelligence threatens to intensify this development further.</p>
<p>He therefore advocates stronger regulation and taxation of large corporations, restrictions on commercial and political advertising and the democratic organisation of the public sphere beyond profit-driven platforms. Furthermore, he regards trade unions, associations and political organisations as central spaces for social change.</p>
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		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/46585/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:57:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Eine Topografie der Tech-Eliten</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/eine-topografie-der-tech-eliten/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:55:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Senza categoria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46567</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena) Eine Topografie der Tech-Eliten, 2026 Three-dimensional network visualisation (augmented reality) &#160; This three-dimensional network map shows connections between influential actors in the US tech scene. Some are loose or coincidental, while others suggest closer relationships. In an immersive journey through this complex web, we highlight connections that <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/eine-topografie-der-tech-eliten/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena)</strong></p>
<p><em>Eine Topografie der Tech-Eliten</em>, 2026<br />
Three-dimensional network visualisation (augmented reality)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>This three-dimensional network map shows connections between influential actors in the US tech scene. Some are loose or coincidental, while others suggest closer relationships. In an immersive journey through this complex web, we highlight connections that we, as researchers, consider significant. At the end of this guided tour, visitors have the opportunity to delve deeper and explore this network for themselves at close range.</p>
<p>Every network visualisation constructs a reality from a potentially infinite amount of data. The starting point for this network was the much-debated question of whether the convergence of economic and algorithmic power is giving rise to a new form of “tech fascism”. Are tech elites working strategically and ideologically towards an authoritarian shift and, if so, how? Our analysis combines publicly available, machine-readable data on prominent figures in the tech world, with information about their ideological affiliations and political donations in US election campaigns.</p>
<p>To this end, we loaded Wikidata entries for 74 actors in the US tech scene, along with selected aspects of their relationships with one another, into a database. This formed the basis of an initial network, which was then expanded through a further sampling loop to approximately 41,000 Wikidata entries. Using a PageRank algorithm, we identified and subsequently analysed around 4,000 of the most significant entries. A note of caution, however: the underlying data tells us only that, for example, Mark Zuckerberg is associated with libertarianism in his Wikipedia entry, but not whether this association is positive or negative. In other words, the data only shows who or what is publicly associated with whom or what.</p>
<p>In addition to Wikidata, the analysis draws on data from the US Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC provides comprehensive information on donations to US federal election campaigns, including presidential, Senate and House of Representatives elections. This also includes information on Political Action Committees (PACs and super PACs), which play a significant role in financing US election campaigns.</p>
<p>Authors:  Harald Sick, Wyn Brodersen and Ann-Kathrin Benner</p>
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		<title>Joshua Citarella</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/joshua-citarella/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:45:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Senza categoria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46297</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[When Guys Turn 20 No.1: DKP is Market Socialism, 2022 Video 05:59 Min When Guys Turn 20 No.2: The Slow Red Pill, 2022 Video 04:44 Min When Guys Turn 20 No.3: On Platforms, 2022 Video 03:55 Min EU speech at the panel discussion: The Internet Left: Progressive Politics in the Digital Age, 2026 Video 10:02 <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/joshua-citarella/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>When Guys Turn 20 No.1: DKP is Market Socialism</em>, 2022<br />
Video<br />
05:59 Min</p>
<p><em>When Guys Turn 20 No.2: The Slow Red Pill</em>, 2022<br />
Video<br />
04:44 Min</p>
<p><em>When Guys Turn 20 No.3: On Platforms</em>, 2022<br />
Video<br />
03:55 Min</p>
<p>EU speech at the panel discussion: <em>The Internet Left: Progressive Politics in the Digital Age</em>, 2026<br />
Video<br />
10:02 Min</p>
<p><em>Doomscroll with Francis Fukuyama</em>, 2025<br />
Video<br />
55:28 Min</p>
<p><em>Doomscroll with Dino Guastella</em>, 2026<br />
Video<br />
74:36 Min</p>
<p><em>Doomscroll with Naomi Klein,</em> 2026<br />
Video<br />
52:05 Min</p>
<p><em>E-deologies</em>, 2022–2025<br />
Flaggendruck<br />
Each 154 x 94 cm</p>
<p>Courtesy Joshua Citarella</p>
<p>New York-based artist Joshua Citarella is now regarded as one of the most important chroniclers of “extremely online” culture. His artistic material is the political and aesthetic culture of the internet: online communities, memes, political radicalisation, ideologies and the ways in which platforms produce political identities.</p>
<p>Over the years, he has investigated how memes, reels and algorithms on platforms such as Instagram, TikTok and 4chan draw young people into radical, niche political ideologies. Following an initial period of photographic, video and installation work, he expanded his practice in 2024 and describes himself as an “artist and internet-culture writer”. Joshua Citarella produces online content as an art form in its own right. Since 2024, he has hosted the <em>Doomscroll</em> podcast, which has become one of the most influential online talk shows internationally. By October 2026, he had conducted 56 conversations, each lasting several hours. During this year’s Biennial, the Whitney Museum in New York served as one of his recording studios. A new episode is released every two weeks, attracting hundreds of thousands of views. The artist reaches audiences by also defining alternative platforms such as Substack, YouTube and Spotify as sites for his art. After years of field research into alternative communication structures, he now applies this experience to build a left-wing counterculture in response to right-wing dominance.</p>
<p>His guests include academics and political theorists, journalists, trade unionists, artists, YouTubers, podcasters and avant-garde thinkers of the New Left. The artist is interested in the intersection of politics and culture, and his subjects include media power and its relationship to political organisation. He seeks to understand how deindustrialisation, wage stagnation despite increased productivity and class inequality make people increasingly susceptible to radicalisation. In conversations with his guests, he repeatedly asks what a countermovement to the resentment-driven appeals of the New Right might look like.</p>
<p>Citarella walks a fine line between art, intellectual work and political education. He does so in a country where the populist-nationalist government censors the cultural work of museums and universities. Unlike Germany’s Basic Law, the US Constitution contains no separate article explicitly guaranteeing the freedom of academic inquiry and art. The central constitutional protection derives from the First Amendment (1791), particularly its provision on “freedom of speech”.</p>
<p>In April 2026, the artist was invited to the European Parliament to share his extensive knowledge of online subcultures and the technological strategies of online propaganda. For this exhibition, the team of the Frankfurter Kunstverein has chosen to present the recording as an exhibit in its own right, reflecting our interest in how art shifts its sphere of influence in response to the conditions of our time.</p>
<p>This exhibition marks Citarella’s second appearance at the Frankfurter Kunstverein. In 2023, he participated as an online artist in Eva &amp; Franco Mattes’ server installation <em>P2P</em>, presented as part of their exhibition <em>Fake Views</em>.</p>
<p>Towards the end of the exhibition, visitors encounter several works by Citarella. At their centre is the 2022 video essay trilogy, <em>When Guys Turn 20</em>, that he made with Jacob Hurwitz-Goodman. It takes its title from memes suggesting that, around the age of twenty, men suddenly embrace an extreme ideology or reshape their entire personality around male historical role models. Citarella himself appears on camera, moving between different settings, roles and parodies. The first part, <em>DKP is Market Socialism</em>, focuses on the online community of <em>World of Warcraft</em>. Using the game’s Dragon Kill Points (DKP) system as an example, Citarella examines how people organise themselves to distribute resources. He uses the DKP mechanism to make economic and socialist theories, such as market socialism, more tangible. In the second part, <em>The Slow Red Pill</em>, he traces the mechanisms through which young people become gradually radicalised online. Initially, these communities used numerous meme accounts to mock the mainstream and established elites. Over time, however, they were deliberately hijacked by actors from the white supremacist scene. The deliberate shifting of the boundaries of acceptable discourse normalised radical ideologies. In the third part of the trilogy, <em>On Platforms</em>, Citarella asks who owns the digital infrastructure and who profits from radicalisation. Initially promising participation and freedom of expression in the early 2010s, platforms gradually became instruments of neoliberal principles, and the monetisation of data and attention emerged. What had once created a digital public sphere became a privately controlled commercial space.</p>
<p>The films unfold at a rapid pace. Citarella is familiar with the codes of the subcultures through which young people, primarily young men, seek to escape loneliness, find a new sense of belonging and shape their identities online, and the artist spent years in close contact with them. The video trilogy draws its energy from its density of information, rapid cuts and succession of countless pop-cultural references. He re-enacts iconic figures associated with these subcultures: Officer K from <em>Blade Runner 2049</em>, Orson Welles in <em>Citizen Kane</em>, Ivanhoe from <em>Robin Hood</em>, Robert De Niro in <em>Taxi Driver</em>, Joe Rogan in his podcast studio, a <em>World of Warcraft</em> gamer, an incel and the Californian gunman responsible for the Santa Barbara shooting, among many others.</p>
<p>The exhibition presents 12 flags from Joshua Citarella’s larger series <em>E-deologies</em>. They originate from online communities that the artist mapped through a form of cyber-ethnographic research. He immersed himself in the meme subcultures of Generation Z teenagers, aged 12 to 17. Still a niche phenomenon in the 2010s, these subcultures have since entered the mainstream. The flags symbolise sampled and recombined fragments of possible identities and ideologies among these teenagers. The individual titles of the flags may seem contradictory, yet each represents a specific self-designation. And these categories functioned as a gamified form of exploring roles and identities. Citarella draws an analogy with the bedrooms of earlier generations, where posters of a favourite band or film hung on the walls.</p>
<p>Young people adopt elements of anarchism, transhumanism, nihilism, socialism, monarchism, libertarianism, primitivism or accelerationism, combining them with queerness and veganism without necessarily feeling committed to a historically coherent political tradition. Citarella thus demonstrates that the once binary classification of political identities into left and right has become increasingly obsolete. The so-called 8Values Test, with its eight opposing values, is now one tool for mapping political positions. Its four axes run between equality and markets, nation and globalism, liberty and authority, and tradition and progress.</p>
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		<title>#Stolzmonat: Anatomie einer rechtsextremen Online-Kampagne</title>
		<link>https://www.fkv.de/en/stolzmonat-anatomie-einer-rechtsextremen-online-kampagne/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FKV]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:10:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Senza categoria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fkv.de/?p=46554</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena), Rina Wilkin #Stolzmonat: Anatomie einer rechtsextremen Online-Kampagne, 2026 Video 10:23 min In late May 2023, far-right activists on Twitter (now X) launched “Stolzmonat”: a nationalist online campaign conceived as a counter-model to the LGBTQ+-friendly Pride Month. What appeared to be spontaneous outrage was in fact a carefully <a href="https://www.fkv.de/en/stolzmonat-anatomie-einer-rechtsextremen-online-kampagne/" class="more-link">...</a>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ Jena), Rina Wilkin </strong></p>
<p><em>#Stolzmonat: Anatomie einer rechtsextremen Online-Kampagne</em>, 2026</p>
<p>Video</p>
<p>10:23 min</p>
<p>In late May 2023, far-right activists on Twitter (now X) launched “Stolzmonat”: a nationalist online campaign conceived as a counter-model to the LGBTQ+-friendly Pride Month. What appeared to be spontaneous outrage was in fact a carefully planned propaganda campaign organised around a hashtag (#stolzmonat). Within less than a month, more than 889,000 posts using the hashtag were circulated. From AfD members of parliament to militant neo-Nazis, thousands of accounts rallied behind a German-themed flag modelled on the design of the rainbow flag. And ready-made memes and accompanying slogans served as an invitation to participate.</p>
<p>This video shows how, with a degree of digital know-how, nationalist propaganda can be strategically carried into the societal mainstream. In principle, this requires little more than a small group of committed activists, a few supporters with a large reach and a polarised public. The committed activists provide the material and set the tone, and they operate fake accounts that like and share their own content hundreds of times within a very short period. Influential channels, such as Björn Höcke’s, adopt the campaign’s visual language and call on their audiences to support it. Even opponents of the campaign inadvertently contributed to its success: outraged responses, counter-campaigns from the left and even warnings issued by security authorities increased the hashtag’s visibility and brought it to the attention of the media.</p>
<p>This reveals the central dilemma that anyone seeking to raise awareness of digital propaganda also contributes to the visibility of the campaigns in question. The pattern of amplification surrounding Stolzmonat is typical: a topic already under public discussion is appropriated and filled with specific content, an army of hyperactive accounts pushes a memorable hashtag into trending topics and, eventually, the media can no longer ignore the artificially generated momentum. Once the media begin to contextualise such content, the strategically disseminated digital propaganda has achieved its objective.</p>
<p>Text, research and data: Maik Fielitz and Harald Sick</p>
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