Written contribution by Luna Vega and Martin Renz, Propaganda and its victims
Propaganda? In today’s parlance, this is primarily a problem attributed to political opponents. They fall for propaganda; they are its “victims.” They blindly believe the obvious lies spouted–depending on their political position–by established political parties and the media or by populists and fascists. Accordingly, some say: politics has always been and always will be propagandistic. Everybody lies to further their own interests, and anyone who overlooks this is naïve or lies to themselves.
A ‘victim’ of propaganda is always someone else, because recognizing propaganda is only easy for those who don’t fall for it: its opponents and its ‘culprits’–that is, those who engage in propaganda. But is it really so easy to distinguish victims, opponents, and culprits?
The intuitive answer to this question is surely a resounding ‘no.’ Nonetheless the word propaganda is often used as if there were a clear distinction between propagandistic and non-propagandistic communication. This raises some urgent issues that visitors to the exhibition “Propaganda – Flooding the Zone With Shit – It’s About Money, Stupid” might ask themselves: Is it always possible to clearly distinguish between propagandists and their victims? Does propaganda have a look? Is there a specific form of propaganda that can be recognized regardless of its specific content? Can facts, truth, and honesty play a role in public debate, or is politics always driven solely by ideology and vested interests? If politics and propaganda are indistinguishable anyway, why does the word sound like an accusation? Isn’t it usually expected that public statements are honest and true?
Flooding the Zone
The Latin root of propaganda – propagare – refers to systematic dissemination and spread. A related term is virality, which is used to describe information that spreads like a germ, driven by the laws of the attention economy. Sensationalism, polarization, and uncertainty continue to guarantee high engagement rates on various platforms–and are therefore also financially lucrative. But while viral content spreads for the sake of spreading, propaganda always serves a political, economic, or cultural purpose.
Anyone who suggests that a statement, post, or poster is propaganda claims that it is disseminated not because of its inherent quality or the truth of its content, but because it is effective in distributing a message. Accordingly, debates around propaganda always also discuss technical and media innovations. To understand propaganda it is essential to gain insight into the technical, economic, and media conditions under which political opinions are disseminated.
However, not every political or technical effort to convince others of one’s own position is propaganda. The distinguishing feature of propaganda is that truth has a place in it only to the extent that it does not hinder the effective dissemination of a specific worldview or pattern of opinion.
The quote by Steve Bannon that gives the exhibition its title is exemplary of this kind of propagandistic perspective on politics:
“The Democrats don’t matter […]. The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal with them is to flood the zone with shit.”[1]
This is how Bannon identifies a central propaganda technique of digital mass media: public debate must be flooded–not with coherent arguments or facts, but with trivialities, falsehoods, and dog whistles–in short: “with shit.” This amounts to an admission. Bannon clearly does not believe that truth should play a central role in public debate–at least not any truth that stands in the way of his ideology. What is crucial here is the thrust of this strategy: it is directed not only against immediate political opponents, but specifically against ‘the media.’ The artificial flood of irrelevant information–whether it’s the fuss over the ‘Gulf of America,’ emotionally charged debates about the skin color of a Hollywood cast, or the latest rhetorical outburst from the White House–serves as a diversion. On such an understanding, the primary purpose of propaganda is to constantly flood public debate with strikingly irrelevant topics so as to suppress the discussion of people’s real concerns.
Bannon’s openness in talking about these issues also shows that there seems to be no need to hide propaganda. But we suspect that it is precisely its recognizability that is an advantage: it makes it easier for supporters to spread it and promote it–regardless of its content. Visitors to the exhibition can form their own opinions about whether there are specific recognizable ways in which propaganda appears. Can propaganda be identified not only due to its content, but also in its form?
Big Lies and Tacit Complicity
Let’s assume for a moment that propaganda is often quite easy to recognize. In that case, the impact of propaganda is not limited to the seduction or manipulation of the public, because then its supposed ‘victims’ are also its ‘perpetrators.’ Propaganda is then always a collaborative endeavor as well. Anyone who recognizes propaganda as such and agrees with it precisely for that reason is making a conscious decision. They value their political opinions or interests more highly than what is real or true.
Historically, this attitude is linked to the concept of the “big lie”—a term from Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf that has taken on new significance since Donald Trump spread the lie surrounding the allegedly rigged 2020 U.S. presidential election:
“In this they proceeded on the sound principle that the magnitude of a lie always contains a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of the people in the very bottom of their hearts tend to be corrupted rather than consciously and purposely evil, and that, therefore, in view of the primitive simplicity of their minds, they more easily fall a victim to a big lie than to a little one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads, and they will not be able to believe in the possibility of such monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation in others; yes, even when enlightened on the subject, they will long doubt and waver, and continue to accept at least one of these causes as true. Therefore, something of even the most insolent lie will always remain and stick.”[2]
Two characteristic features of a propagandistic attitude are clearly evident in this quote. First, it reveals a contempt for the “masses,” whom Hitler portrays as simple-minded and incapable of grasping the truth. The lie he is referring to here is also “big” in the sense that it is actually easy to recognize as a lie—and that is precisely why it is effective. Second, historically, the quote is situated within the context of two central right-wing conspiracy myths: the “stab-in-the-back” myth–according to which Germany was not defeated militarily but due to the activities of democrats, socialists, and Jewish people–and the narrative of a communist-Jewish global conspiracy. Hitler presents his own lie as a necessary countermeasure couched in other propagandistic lies. The “big lie” is thus disguised as self-defense with no alternative and as counter-propaganda. Whether he, as a propagandist, believes in these conspiracy narratives himself is not really relevant. What matters is the dogmatic conviction that in political struggle, it is not the truth that decides the outcome, but victory alone: effectiveness.
This is where the cycle of victim and culprit comes full circle. Whether the individual actually believes every detail of the lie becomes secondary. What matters is the willingness to agree. The “big lie” relieves the believer of reality’s complexity and forges a sense of identity against an imagined enemy. “Falling for it” thus becomes a form of complicity, either because collaborators want to believe it or it becomes an oath of loyalty, through which one hopes to gain personal advantages by going along with the lie. Thus understood, propaganda is a discursive framework in which irresponsible and deceitful political behavior is normalized.
Against Counter-Propaganda
The greatest allure of propaganda lies in the way it is presented as having no alternative. This applies to war, where it is used to demoralize the enemy, as it does to marketing—which, in Germany until the early 20th century, was openly called “propaganda” and, driven by the pursuit of profit, during the 20th century tended to create new needs rather than promising to satisfy those that already existed.
But it is even more obvious in politics. When confronted with propaganda, even small-d democrats are tempted to denounce the truth. Resorting to counter-propaganda then seems like an appealing means of defense–especially since we rarely have direct access to irrefutable facts, but are always reliant on mediation, research, and expertise; this makes lying easy and speaking the truth difficult. Yet anyone who responds with counter-propaganda tacitly accepts the propagandistic outlook on politics: politics then degenerates into a mudslinging contest over who can make the biggest spectacle.
However, if we leave the field to propagandists, social reality disconnects from those institutions that specialize in uncovering and conserving the truth. This is where a second aspect of Bannon’s quote becomes relevant. It is not aimed at his immediate political opponent, the Democratic Party, but at the media–and not primarily in its role as opinion-shaper. After all, opinion columns do address the Gulf of America or the skin color of the latest Hollywood cast, or Trump’s most recent verbal outburst. What Bannon is actually attacking is one of journalism’s core functions, which is increasingly drowning. Journalism always also had the task of reporting and verifying facts, to weigh different perspectives, and to make informed and criticizable choices about what should be considered socially relevant. But when newsrooms are constantly flooded with supposed breaking news, there’s no longer any need to confront uncomfortable truths–simply because they can’t be heard.
Other institutions responsible for researching facts are also under fire due to the propagandization of politics: academia, the courts, museums, universities, and archives. As precarious and open to scrutiny as these institutions may be individually, they are nonetheless based on the consensus that verifiable truth in the public sphere is both necessary and possible.
The democratic response to propaganda should therefore not consist in counter-propaganda or endless fact-checking. What is needed is a clear commitment to the value of uncomfortable truths, as well as legal and social remembrance and protection for all those who uncover it–from Émile Zola (“J’accuse”) and John Heartfield, through WikiLeaks and Forensic Architecture, to Edward Snowden, Alexei Navalny, and Chelsea Manning. After all, the work of truth-tellers and whistleblowers may have its own distinct look as well, which the exhibition brings to life.
Dealing with propaganda is not just about education or lecturing. Reports of families torn apart by the appeal of conspiracy narratives (as in the context of the MAGA movement) highlight the need for a shift in perspective. Instead of asking “Do people really believe these things?” we should ask, “Why do people actually want to believe these things?” What political interests, promises, or emotional relief does this narrative serve? What neglect and failings have fueled these desires? How can we create a political system that actually serves people? And which existing societal problems and stereotypes provide fertile ground for belief in and support of propaganda?
We should pause and consider how to face propaganda and its collaborators. When the zone is flooded, the solution isn’t to paddle endlessly against the current, but to drain the pool–to drain the shit.[3]
References
[1] Michael Lewis, „Has Anyone Seen the President?“, Bloomberg, 9. Februar 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-09/has-anyone-seen-the-president [16.10.2026].
[2] Ralph Manheim, Übers., Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1971), S. 231f.
[3] We thank Robert Thyssen, Sonja Dormeyer and Luca Schepers for helpful feedback.